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Disproportional Ownership Structure and IPO Long-run 
Performance of Entrepreneurial Firm in China 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO 
long-run performance in China. Although entrepreneurial firms underperform the 
market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs 
with ownership control wedge. Entrepreneurial firms with one share one vote structure 
outperform those with ownership control wedge by 30% for 3 years post-IPO in either 
buy-and-hold or cumulative monthly returns. Entrepreneurial firms with excess 
ownership control wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying 
related party transactions. These findings suggest that entrepreneurial firms need to 
improve corporate governance such as disproportional ownership structure to better 
safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders. 
 
Keywords: IPO, Long-run performance, Excess control, Disproportionate ownership, 
Corporate governance, Entrepreneurial firms 




Initial Public Offering (IPO)’s performance has important implications for public 
investors. IPO literature has clearly documented the phenomenon of pervasive long-run 
IPO underperformance. The literature (Ritter 1991; Loughran & Ritter 1995) shows 
that IPO stocks on a 3-5 year horizon underperforms the market or matching firms. Jain 
and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that IPO firms experience a decline in 
their post-issue operating performance. Pagano et al. (1998) attribute the post-IPO fall 
in profitability to the window opportunity hypothesis when entrepreneurs want to take 
advantage of market timing.  
 In this paper, we examine whether the difference in ownership structure at firm 
level can explain IPO long-run (under)performance in China. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) point out that large owners gain major control of the corporation and extract 
private benefits. Large shareholders often prefer disproportional ownership structure in 
which their control rights are much greater than cash flow rights in emerging markets. 
Such disproportional ownership structure becomes a major channel to facilitate 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2000; Lemmon 
and Lins, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Bae et al., 2012). These empirical studies 
document a negative association between firm value/performance and disproportional 
ownership structure in non-IPO contexts. Yeh et al. (2008) study IPO first-day return 
and disproportional ownership structure in Taiwan. Different from all these studies, we 
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investigate IPO long-run performance in association with disproportional ownership 
structure in China.  
Post-IPO’s secondary market is important place for most small and public 
investors to trade IPO firms. Many IPO underwriting process favors institutional 
investors so that small investor can only buy hot IPOs after they are traded. It is thus 
relevant to understand IPO long-run performance. On the other hand, IPO market 
offers an ideal place to investigate the causality between performance that is observed 
ex post and ownership structure ex ante. Most studies on ownership and performance 
are subject to endogeneity problem since they are jointly determined. We hypothesize 
that IPO firms with pre-IPO ownership control wedge will underperform other IPO 
firms in the long run due to the expropriation by controlling shareholders. We not only 
examine IPO’s long-run stock performance using both cross-sectional approaches and 
calendar-time portfolio analysis, but also report operating performance post-IPO. 
Furthermore, we try to understand the channels through which disproportional 
ownership decrease long-run performance post-IPO. 
This paper is the first to explicitly examine the long-run performance implications 
of ownership control wedge in IPO literature. First, as other emerging markets, China’s 
corporate governance system and investor protection are weak for small shareholders 
due to weak institutions. One implication is that the entrenchment effects of a 
disproportionate ownership structure are likely to be pronounced in this market. Second, 
small retail investors actively investing in Chinese IPOs are naïve ones, which means 
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IPO long-run performance is critical. Third, equity market provides a critical source of 
external financing for non-government owned firms, which comprise the majority of 
IPOs during the recent years. Most of firms in China are characterized with a 
concentrated and disproportional ownership structure. Our findings therefore have 
general implications of ownership structure and IPO firm performance in countries 
with weak institutions.  
We utilize a comprehensive sample of non-SOEs, and the sample includes 258 IPO 
companies listing between 2002 and 2008 (51% of all the IPOs including SOEs). SOEs 
are excluded in this research primarily due to the state ownership structure and 
government interference
2
. Most listed SOEs do not exhibit disproportional ownership 
structure. We manually collect ownership information such as ultimate owners, 
controlling shareholders’ cash flow and control rights. Disproportional ownership is 
quite pervasive: 53% of our IPO companies are characterized by excessive control 
rights. We find that IPOs with excess control significantly underperform both the 
market and other IPOs. With three-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHR) 
and cumulative abnormal market-adjusted returns (CAR), IPOs with an ownership 
wedge underperform other by 32% and 26%, respectively. Strong long-run 
underperformance patterns hold with alternative measures such as CAPM or 
Fama-French portfolio methods. We also find IPOs with excess control rights show 
                                                             
2
 State owned enterprises (SOEs) often are listed through share-issue privatization through which state 
controls a majority stake. SOEs often receive preferential treatment in bank credit, government subsidy 
and market entry compared to private enterprises. 
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significant decline in operating performance post-IPO.  
We further provide analysis to understand the channels through which 
disproportional ownership leads to lower long-run performance. First, we rule out IPO 
mispricing
3
 as a driver of underperformance for firms with excess control rights. We 
find that first day return is negatively associated with excess control rights. This 
suggests IPOs with disproportional ownership have lower underpricing, partially 
excluding a possibility that overpricing leads to low long-run stock returns. We 
furthermore link firm performance and ownership structures to related party 
transactions. Recent studies suggest that when corporate wealth can be transferred from 
listed firms to their controlling shareholders, tunneling activities lead to poor 
performance (Peng et al., 2010). We show that the frequency of value-destroying 
related party transactions is increasing in the presence and magnitude of excess control 
rights in IPO firms.    
This paper makes significant contributions to the literature: it is the first to focus 
on the relation between disproportionate ownership structure and long-run performance 
in IPOs. It documents strong entrenchment effects of excess control rights in newly 
listed firms. More importantly, it contributes to the literature on IPO long-term 
performance. We show first time in the literature that disproportional ownership 
structure can explain IPO long-run underperformance. We show channels through 
                                                             
3
 Loughran et al., (1994) document IPO underpricing is a common phenomenon. Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) attribute such underpricing
3
 to irrational behavior such as speculation bubbles and market fads. 
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which controlling shareholders expropriate minority ones by undertaking 
value-destroying related party transactions.    
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 introduces our data and sample. 
Section 4 analyzes the impact of the divergence between the ultimate owner’s cash 
flow and control rights on long-run performance. Section 5 addresses the effect of the 
ultimately controlling shareholders’ excess control rights on the underpricing of 
non-state controlled IPOs, and section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
1. Literature review  
 The very first investigation into the divergence between cash flow and control 
rights by La Porta et al., (1999), which covers companies from 27 countries, suggests 
that controlling shareholders can gain control rights in excess of their cash flow claims 
through a pyramid structure and the common practice of ownership concentration. In 
emerging markets, particularly, where concentrated ownership structure is widespread, 
agency costs are more like to originate from a conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders. Classens Djankov, Fan, et al., (2000), for example, identify a 
pyramid structure and cross shareholding as the major organizational strategy used by 
firms in nine East Asian economies to separate ownership and control. They also 
provide important evidence that entrenchment effects on corporate governance 
stemming from the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights can 
8 
 
significantly decrease firm value (Classens, Djankov, and Lang, 2002), a claim 
supported by several later studies (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; 
Gompers et al., 2010).  
Fan et al. (2011) show that the cost of expropriation is ultimately born by a 
controlling owner who must then devote substantial resources to mitigate the cost, 
while other researchers identify several channels through which large shareholders 
tunnel benefits. Cheung et al.’s (2006) analysis of related party transactions between 
Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders, for instance, associates 
these transactions with the wealth losses of minority shareholders. Likewise, Peng et al. 
(2010) provide evidence that in Chinese listed firms whose financial condition is sound, 
controlling shareholders use related party transactions to extract private benefits from 
minority shareholders.   
In general, the literature on IPO performance documents two phenomena relevant 
for shareholders: pervasive short-run underpricing of IPOs across markets and time 
periods and long-run IPO underperformance of the market in the long term, usually 
over three- or five-year periods (Ritter, 1991). Jain and Kini (1994), for example, find 
that new IPOs experience declines in operating performance post issuance. For China, 
Chan et al. (2004) document both underpricing and long-run underperformance, while 
Sun and Tong (2003) show that post-issue performance is negatively related to state 
ownership but positively related to legal-entity ownership. Wang (2005) also 
documents a sharp decline in post-IPO operating performance but argues that neither 
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state ownership nor ownership concentration is related to performance. A negative 
relation between a disproportionate ownership structure and the initial return of IPOs is 
identified by Yeh et al. (2008), but their study focuses on the Taiwanese market only.  
All these studies, however, despite being focused on ownership’s effect on IPO 
performance, fail to explore the implication of the first-order agency problems that 
arise from ownership concentration; that is, the conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders. In the context of a disproportionate ownership economy, 
controlling shareholders are likely to have perverse incentives because of an excess of 
control rights. If the result is expropriation, it should be evident in IPOs. We therefore 
fill this research void by linking IPO performance to disproportionate ownership 
structure in newly listed firms. 
 The agency problem of disproportionate ownership structure results from conflicts 
of interest. In particular, through a pyramid ownership structure and cross-shareholding, 
controlling shareholders can exert control in excess of their cash flow rights, an 
imbalance that also makes them less subject to board governance and market discipline. 
Such entrenched controlling shareholders are more likely to pursue private benefits at 
the expense of minority shareholders or outside investors through such activities as 
related party transactions or connected party transactions in which corporate wealth can 
be expropriated through tunneling (Faccio et al., 2001). Fan and Wong (2002) show 
that in East Asian corporations, the earnings-return relation decreases with the level of 
controlling shareholders’ excess control rights. 
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In the past three decades, China has undergone a profound institutional reform that 
has transformed its economic system from a central planning economy to a fairly 
decentralized market economy in which almost two-thirds of the nation’s GDP is 
produced by the private sector (China Annuals of Statistics, 2009). Since the opening 
of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 
December 1990 and July 1991, respectively, China’s stock market has developed 
rapidly. In the early years, the majority of Chinese listed companies were former state 
owned enterprises (SOEs); however, since then the number of IPOs with non-state 
ownership has increased gradually through share issue privatization. Between 2002 and 
2007, for example, the proportion of non-state controlled listed firms among all 
publicly listed companies in China increased from 18% to 67%. Because SOEs have 
unique institutional features (e.g., fulfilling public policy objectives for employment or 
GPD growth; Putterman and Dong, 2000), however, they are excluded from this study. 
  
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Sample 
 Our sample comprises all companies (excluding SOEs) that launched IPOs on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2008. 
We restrict our observations to these years because the reporting of cash flow and 
control rights has only been mandated in China since 2002, and our long-term 
performance analysis requires at least three years of post-issue data, necessitating the 
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inclusion of companies that went public prior to December 2008. We also exclude 
financial firms because of their unique accounting standards, and firms with incomplete 
pre- or post-issue financial information. Our final sample consists of 258 firms that 
launched IPOs during the 2002–2008 period. We compile our dataset by merging IPO 
firm characteristics, market performance, financial information, and ownership data 
from the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database with related 
party transactions information from the RESSET database. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Long-term IPO performance  
 We evaluate the post-IPO performance of the non-state controlled firms in our 
sample using both market- and accounting-based measures. Our market-based 
performance measures are the 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month post-IPO 
buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (BHR) and the cumulative abnormal 
market-adjusted stock returns (CAR). We calculate our results on the basis of monthly 
stock returns starting from the first month after the IPO date. 
We compute the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (BHR) as follows: 
 
where Rit is the buy-and-hold return of stock i from month 1 to month t, and rit is the 




where Rmt is the buy-and-hold return of the market portfolio from month 1 to month t, 
and rmt is the monthly market return, computed as the value weighted returns of all 
stocks traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchanges. 
The buy-and-hold market-adjusted return (BHR) is thus 
 
and the cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CAR) is 
 
where ARit is the abnormal return of stock i at month t, rit is the monthly raw return of 
the stock, and rmt is the monthly market return, computed as the value weighted returns 
of all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai Stock Exchanges. The 
cumulative abnormal market-adjusted return (CAR) from event month 1 to month t is 
thus 
 
To validate our value weighted returns of all common stocks traded on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, we use them as adjustments in our analyses of 
market-based performance measures: our regression results remain qualitatively similar 
to those using equally weighted indexes. 
We also evaluate firm performance using accounting-based measures, which, 
however, raises the issue of all Chinese pre-IPO accounting data being subject to 
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accounting manipulation to fulfill listing requirements (Aharony et al., 2000). Such 
manipulation can create a downward bias in the accounting performance change 
measures, a bias that we take into account by weighting the results based on stock 
return measures more heavily than those based on accounting return measures. For our 
analysis, we adopt three industry-adjusted
4
 accounting performance measures: sales 
growth, earnings growth, and the change in return on sales (ROS), calculated as the 
difference between the firm-specific and industry-median value of performance 
measure. We use ROS, calculated as net income divided by sales, rather than ROA or 
ROE because Fan et al. (2007) argue that measures based on equity or assets might 
create a downward bias on Chinese post-IPO firm performance.
5
 Likewise, because 
prior studies on post-IPO performance typically compare accounting performance 
changes a few years before and a few years after listing (Megginson et al., 1994; 
D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Wang, 2005), we use a firm’s pre-IPO accounting 
figures as a benchmark for evaluating its post-IPO performance. We compute the 
change in ROS by subtracting the average ROS in the three years immediately prior to 
the IPO from the average of the three years of annual ROS after the IPO. The earnings 
(sales) growth measure is the percentage change in the average level of earnings (sales) 
over the three years immediately prior to the IPO to three years after the IPO. It should 
be noted, however, that we have omitted the accounting numbers in the IPO year 
                                                             
4 We employ the six-industry classifications borrowed from Firth et al. (2006): finance, industrial, commercial, 
public utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries). 
5 See Fan et al. (2007) for more details. 
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because these data tend to be heavily manipulated (Fan et al., 2007). 
3.2.2. Underpricing of IPO issues 
We calculate the underpricing of an IPO issue as the return on the first day of 
trading (relative to the offering price): 
 
where Reti0 is the initial return (underpricing) of stock i, Pi0 is the closing price of stock 
i on the first trading day, and Pil is the offering price of stock i. 
The market return on the first trading day of the new stock is  
 
where Retim is the market return on the first trading day of the new stock i, Pi,m0 is the 
closing price of the appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index that 
corresponds to the offering day of the new stock i, and Pi,ml is the closing price of the 
appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index on the first trading day of the new 
stock i . 
We adjust the return for the market effect as follows: 
 
where AdjReti0 is the initial return (underpricing) of stock i. 
3.2.3. Ownership type, cash flow rights, and control rights 
To examine the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure, we first identify 
the ultimate controlling shareholders by tracing the chain of ownership. Consistent with 
previous studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002), we define control rights 
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as the weakest link in the chain and cash flow rights as the product of ownership stakes 
along the chain. To illustrate, if an ultimately controlling shareholder owns 70% of the 
stock of publicly traded firm A, which in turn has 35% of the stock of firm B, then the 
ultimately controlling shareholder controls 35% of firm C, the weakest link in the 
control rights chain, and has cash flow rights of 24.5%, the product of the two 
ownership stakes along the chain. Because of a pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, 
and dual-class stocks, the largest shareholders’ control rights are always in excess of its 
cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999), and because controlling shareholders’ control 
rights exceed their cash flow rights, they always have the incentive and opportunity to 
expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 provides a description of the sample. As Panel A clearly shows, the IPO 
firms are unevenly distributed across the sample period, which largely reflects the 
overall IPO pattern in China. From 2002 to 2006, the Chinese stock market 
experienced a serious bear market in which the Shanghai Stock Index dropped from 
2,200 in mid-2001 to 1,050 in mid-2005, and only a few firms (e.g., eight in 2005) 
were willing to go public. Panel A also reveals that an average 53.49% of the sample 
firms have a disproportionate ownership structure, with the highest percentage 
occurring in 2005, when all the IPO firms had such a structure, and the lowest (40.91%) 
occurring in 2003. In the remaining years, the percentages fluctuate from 43.10% to 
63.27%. The presence of a disproportionate ownership structure also varies across 
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industries: the highest percentage occurs in the property and real estate and commercial 
sectors (62.50% and 58.71), followed by the conglomerate sector (55.00%), the 
industrial sector (52.63%), and the public utilities sector (50.00%). 
Panel B reports firm characteristics at the time of the IPO. With a mean initial 
return of 126.20%, the average levels of underpricing are lower than those reported in 
earlier research (Mok and Hui, 1998; Su and Fleisher, 1999; Chan et al., 2004). 
Nonetheless, the underpricing of IPOs in China is still much higher than that in 
developed markets (Loughran et al., 1994):
6
 the mean (median) number of shares 
issued (in millions) is 34.08 (28) and the mean (median) issue price of the IPOs is 
10.83 (10.04) RMB. Panel B also shows average cash flow rights of 32.15% as 
compared to excess control rights of 7.48%, which indicates a clear divergence 
between the largest shareholders’ control rights and their cash flow rights in non-state 
controlled IPOs firms. 
Panel C reports the mean and median values of the stock-based and 
accounting-based performance measures for the sample. It clearly shows that the 
average BHR and CAR of newly listed non-state controlled firms in China fall initially 
and then increase in the three years subsequent to their IPOs, although the median BHR 
of these firms remains negative. As regards the accounting-based measures, the 
post-IPO sales and earnings growth measures are quite substantial, averaging 124.37% 
                                                             
6




for sales and 32.75% for earnings relative to the pre-IPO period. However, the mean 
(median) change in the three-year average ROS of the sample is a negative -11.94% 
(-8.39%), reflecting a decline in Chinese IPO firms’ accounting performance that is 
consistent with the data reported by Aharony et al. (2000) and Sun and Tong (2003). 
 
4. Disproportionate ownership structure and long-term firm performance  
In this section, we investigate how the disproportionate ownership structure of 
non-state controlled IPO firms affects their long-term market-based performance and 
accounting-based performance. 
4.1. Univariate tests 
 Figure 1 plots the mean BHRs and CARs, respectively, of non-state controlled 
IPOs firms in China sorted by whether or not the largest shareholders have excess 
control rights. In Panel A, the mean BHR of the group of IPOs firms with excess 
control remain negative over the three years, while the mean BHR of the group of IPOs 
firms without excess control exhibits as large an increase as 30% in later years. 
Likewise, in Panel B, the mean CAR of IPOs firms without excess control rises much 
more steeply than that of IPOs firms with excess control.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 reports the mean and median values of the market-based and 
accounting-based performance measures for two subsamples sorted by whether or not 
the firms are characterized by excess control rights. In each of the three post-IPO years, 
18 
 
the mean and median BHRs and CARs of firms with excess shareholder control rights 
are statistically significantly lower than those for firms without (except for the 
36-month BHRs after IPO, whose results are not significant). This finding indicates 
that the post-IPO market can indeed distinguish between the two groups of firms. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the difference in average BHRs and CARs between the 
two groups grows larger over time, suggesting that over the years, the market gradually 
perceives the negative effects of entrenchment. Our between-group comparison of 
accounting-based performance measures further shows that firms with excess control 
rights experience a more substantial drop in average ROS and slower sales and 
earnings growth than do their counterparts without excess control rights. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2. Regressions 
To examine the effects of disproportionate ownership structure on non-state 
controlled firms’ post-IPO performance, we perform regression analyses using 
generalized least squares to control for sample heterogeneity. Tables 3 and 4 summarize 
our regression results using the 12-, 24-, and 36-month BHRs and CARs as dependent 
variables. The regressions also include the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash 
flow rights (Cash), the degree of excess control (Ex_wedge), and a dummy 
(Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights is larger than zero. The control 
variables are the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a 
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dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, and year and industry dummies to control for the effect of year and industry 
factors. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Consistent with the univariate results reported in table 2, the multivariate 
regression results show that firms with a disproportionate ownership structure 
experience a more statistically significant stock performance decline after the IPO. The 
magnitude of the differences in BHR and CAR between these two subsamples is also 
similar to the univariate results even after we control for firm-specific factors that 
could affect post-IPO stock return performance. As shown in table 3, firms with a 
disproportionate ownership structure underperform those without in BHR by 9.02% 12 
months post IPO, 8.27% 24 months post IPO, and 4.93% 36 months post IPO, although 
the effect is not significant for the 24-month and 36-month post-IPO periods. In fact, 
every one percentage increase in excess control rights results in a 0.55% (0.68%, 
0.77%) decrease in BHRs 12 months (24 months, 36 months) post IPO, although this 
decrease is not significant for the 36-month post-IPO period. Likewise, as shown in 
table 4, firms with a disproportionate ownership structure significantly underperform 
those without in CAR by 8.73% 12 months post IPO, 15.44% 24 months post IPO, and 
13.63% 36 months post IPO. Again, every one percentage increase in excess control 
rights results in a significant 0.62% (1.04%, 1.16%) decrease in CAR 12 months (24 
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months, 36 months) after the IPO. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 reports the results of our regressions analyzing the effects of a 
disproportionate ownership structure on changes in post-IPO accounting performance, 
with the change in ROS, sales growth, and earnings growth as the dependent variables. 
The independent variables are the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights 
(Cash), the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge), a dummy (Ex_dummy) for 
excess control rights, the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets 
(LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies to control for the effect of year and 
industry factors. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 The regression results indicate that firms with a disproportionate ownership 
structure experience deteriorating accounting performance subsequent to their IPOs 
regardless of whether performance is measured by the change in ROS, sales growth, or 
earnings growth. The difference in the accounting variable is around -3.67% for the 
change in ROS, -27.07% for sales growth, and -48.56% for earnings growth, and every 
one percentage increase in excess control rights results in a 0.24% decline for the 
change in ROS, a 3.66% slower sales growth, and 3.43% slower earnings growth. 
These results are consistent with the univariate results reported in table 2. 
According to Aharony et al. (2000), in managing their earnings, Chinese firms 
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typically manipulate accruals and profits from non-core operations. Therefore, to check 
the robustness of our results and to bring our accounting-based measures more in line 
with those of previous studies, we also use operating earnings/assets, operating 
earnings growth, and net income growth as accounting-based performance measures to 
test the relation between a disproportionate ownership structure and performance 
changes. As table 6 indicates, even using these alternative post-IPO accounting 
performance changes, the level of excess control rights remains negatively correlated 
with firms’ accounting performance subsequent to the IPO. More specifically, firms 
whose ultimately controlling shareholders have more excess control rights experience a 
greater drop in operating earnings/assets and slower operating earnings growth and net 
income growth. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Taken together, the regression results in tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 suggest that non-state 
controlled firms in China that have issued IPOs generally show poorer stock returns 
and accounting performance when the ultimately controlling shareholders can exert 
control through a pyramidal structure or cross-shareholding using control rights that are 
in excess of cash flow rights. 
4.3 Calendar-time analysis 
The above findings raise another important issue: whether IPOs without excess 
control who outperform IPOs with excess control also outperform the market. To 
answer this question, we perform an additional analysis of the returns of non-state 
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controlled IPO firms using calendar time. Specifically, we compile portfolios by 
including firms that went public within the 36-month period and then both equally 
weight the observations and value weight them based on the first trading day’s market 
capitalization for each company. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
As table 7 shows, the equally weighted portfolios of IPO firms with excess control 
show monthly excess returns relative to the equally weighted market index for the 
Shanghai (A share market) and Shenzhen exchanges (A share market and Growth 
Enterprise Market) of -0.56%. Relative to the value weighted market index of -0.21%, 
however, neither firms with excess control nor those without differ statistically from 
zero. Also on a monthly basis, the IPOs firms without excess control on average 
underperform both the value and equally weighted market index by -0.37 and -0.01, 
respectively. Using the value weighted calendar-time portfolios, however, both IPOs 
with and without excess control underperform the value and equally weighted market 
indexes, although relative to the market, the underperformance is not significantly 
different from zero. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 8 reports the results of a calendar-time regression analysis using monthly 
portfolios of non-state controlled IPOs with and without excess control compiled by 
including all issues undertaken in the 36 months prior to the month of observation. We 
run both CAPM and Fama and French (1993) regressions, using the monthly returns of 
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these portfolios between January 2002 and December 2008 as the dependent variable. 
Consistent with the univariate tests, we find that both equally and value weighted IPOs 
with excess control underperform the market, with alphas of about -0.16% (CAPM) 
and -0.27% (Fama and French) for equally weighted and -0.28% and -0.30% for value 
weighted IPOs with excess control calendar-time portfolios, respectively. In neither set 
of regressions are the alphas statistically different from zero, and the alphas for the 
equally weighted IPOs without excess control, although positive, are insignificant. Nor 
does the value weighted portfolio of IPOs without excess control differ significantly 
from the market. Whereas all non-state controlled IPOs show positive exposure to firm 
size (the SMB factor) with SMB coefficients that are positive and significantly 
different from zero at both the 1% and 5% levels of significance, the book-to-market 
(HML factor) coefficients are not significant. Overall, therefore, these results indicate 
that although IPOs with excess control underperform IPOs without excess control, 
neither type performs differently from the market. 
4.4 Disproportionate ownership structure and related party transactions 
On the assumption that controlling shareholders can expropriate minority 
shareholders by tunneling the wealth of listed firms, we now explore whether a firm 
with disproportionate ownership structure is more likely to conduct tunneling activities. 
Using related party transactions as proxies, we measure the effect of the wedges 
between cash flow rights and control rights on the probability of a firm undertaking 
tunneling transactions using the likelihood of a firm undertaking a value-destroying 
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related party transaction as the dependent variable. Because there is no accurate 
measure of exactly how much benefit is transferred through these transactions, as in 
prior studies (Cheung et al., 2006, 2009), we use the market reaction to related party 
transaction announcements as a proxy. A negative market reaction indicates tunneling, 
which reduces firm value and goes against the interests of minority shareholders. We 
define value-destroying related party transactions as any connected transaction 
associated with negative cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) 
over trading day windows [0,+1], [-1,+1], [-2,+2], [-2,+5] relative to the announcement 
day (day 0). The independent variables are the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash 
flow rights (Cash), the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge), a dummy 
(Ex_dummy) for excess control rights, the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of 
total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies to control for the effect 
of year and industry factors. We report the estimates of our logistic models in table 9. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
As the table clearly shows, firms with a disproportionate ownership structure are 
more likely to engage in value-destroying related party transactions, and the likelihood 
of a firm’s engaging in such transactions increases with the divergence between cash 
flow rights and control rights. Moreover, consistent with Cheung et al.’s (2006) 
findings, the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders and firm size are negatively 
related to value-destroying related party transactions. Overall, the evidence in table 9 
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indicates a positive relation between disproportionate ownership and the likelihood of 
controlling shareholders expropriating minority shareholders. This relation is stronger 
for IPO firms with a wider wedge between controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights 
and control rights. This evidence further indicates that, in long-term, the 
underperformance of IPOs with excess control rights relative to IPOs without excess 
control rights is partly driven by their higher likelihood of undertaking 
value-destroying related party transactions. 
 
5. Disproportionate ownership structure and initial IPO returns  
This section examines how the disproportionate ownership structure of non-state 
controlled IPO firms affects initial IPO returns (underpricing). Table 10 reports the 
mean and median market-adjusted initial stock returns for our sample, sorted by 
controlling shareholders’ excess control rights and year. As the table shows, in most 
years, firms with a disproportionate ownership structure show smaller initial returns 
than firms without, a difference in mean (median) market-adjusted initial return of 
112.53% versus 140.89% (88.24 versus 101.70), which is significant at the 5% (10%) 
level. These results support our hypothesis that the largest controlling shareholders’ 
excess control rights have a negative impact on the initial returns of non-state 
controlled IPO firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
To distinguish the effect of a disproportionate ownership structure on the initial 
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returns of non-state controlled firms, we also perform a regression analysis that 
controls for additional firm, industry, year, and institutional factors in China’s IPO 
markets. The dependent variable in this model is the IPO’s initial stock return, 
including both the unadjusted initial return (FirstDayReturn) and the market-adjusted 
return (AdjustedFirstDayReturn). Our key independent variables are the degree of the 
excess control rights (Ex_wedge) and a dummy (Ex_dummy) for the largest 
shareholders having excess control rights. As in table 9, when we include the key 
independents and only control for year and industry factors, the estimated coefficients 
are significantly negative at the 1% level for the degree of excess control rights 
(Ex_wedge) and at the 10% level for the presence of largest shareholders’ excess 
control rights (Ex_dummy). 
We then run further regressions that include additional control variables suggested 
by prior research on IPO underpricing. Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), for example, 
suggest that underpricing can be affected by the time gap between the offering and the 
listing. That is, because the information known by issuers, underwriters, and investors 
is asymmetrical (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986), the longer the time lags between the 
offering and the listing, the higher the risk to investors and thus the greater the 
probability of underpricing. In fact, both Chan et al. (2004) and Su (2004) provide 
empirical evidence that IPO underpricing in China is positively related to the 
offering-to-listing time lag. To capture the effects of this information asymmetry, we 
include the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing 
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dates (LnDays), together with other variables commonly used in related studies of 
Chinese IPOs (Su and Fleisher, 1999; Chan et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2004). These latter, 
used here as independent variables, include the ultimately controlling shareholders’ 
cash flow rights (Cash); the age of the firms(LnAge), represented by the natural 
logarithm of one plus the age in years of the company from the date on which it was 
first listed (with any part of a year treated as a whole year); the issue size (LnIssueSize), 
represented by the natural logarithm of the number of shares issued; and a dummy 
(Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
The results of these multiple regressions, shown in table 11, indicate that the time 
lag between the IPO date and the first trading date is insignificant in explaining IPO 
underpricing. Although this result contrasts with those of earlier studies (Mok and Hui, 
1998; Su and Fleisher,1999; Chen et al.,2004), it is consistent with more recent 
findings that the time lag in the Chinese IPO market has been dramatically shortened, 
thereby removing previously unknown factors caused by the long time lag (Yu and Tse, 
2006). The coefficients for the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge) and the 
dummy variable (Ex_dummy) remain negative, the second significantly so at the 10% 
(5%) level. The marginally lower initial return, or smaller underpricing, associated with 
a disproportionate ownership structure is consistent with our second hypothesis that, in 
non-state controlled IPO firms, the excess control rights enjoyed by ultimately 
controlling shareholders become entrenched in a disproportionate ownership structure, 
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thereby giving largest controlling shareholders less incentive to underprice new issues. 
These results, which support our second hypothesis, are also consistent with Yeh et 
al.’s (2008) findings for Taiwan. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Public investors invest in IPOs at capital markets because they believe in the 
issuing firms’ future prospects, financial performance, and corporate governance. In 
China, the world’s largest emerging economy, although the IPO market is actively 
attracting critical financing from retail investors, the long-run IPO performance is 
proving dismal. Many newly listed firms are essentially controlled by private owners 
through a complex pyramid ownership structure, which gives their controlling 
shareholders greater control rights in excess of their cash flow rights. Under this 
disproportionate ownership structure, controlling shareholders are incentivized to 
expropriate minority shareholders. IPOs with the disproportional ownership structure 
should be deemed as bad investment in the long run for public investors. 
Utilizing a hand-collected data on ownership for publicly listed non-SOEs, we 
show that IPO firms characterized by excess control rights significantly underperform 
other IPOs in the long-run stock and operating performance. Our findings thus suggest 
that the conflict between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
remains the primary agency problem because of the significant entrenchment effect 
generated by disproportional ownership structures. Furthermore we show that IPO 
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firms with excess control show significantly lower first day return but are associated 
with higher frequency of value-destroying related party transactions, suggesting that 
the latter reason can explain IPO-run poor performance. 
This research has important implications for both investors and regulators. First, 
small public investors interested in IPOs must understand the ownership structure of 
the newly listed firm and rationally discount the price of such firms commensurate with 
the adverse incentives of controlling shareholders. Disproportional ownership 
structures have to be considered as an important corporate governance issue. 
Regulators, for their part, must recognize that the current investor protection systems 
need to address the challenge of protecting minority investors in corporations 
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Table 1: Sample and Variables Summary statistics  
 
This table presents summary information on the sample of non-state controlled IPO firms in China. 
Panel A reports the sample by year of IPO and by industry sector. Panel B lists the IPO firm 
characteristics, includeing initial return, market-adjusted initial return, firm age, issue size (i.e., the 
number of shares issued in millions), the number of days between the offering and listing dates, the 
listing date issue (ordering) price, the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, and the 
level of excess control rights (i.e., the difference between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ 
cash flow rights and control rights). Panel C reports statistics for the two market-based performance 
measures of non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public during 2002–2008 and for the 
accounting-based performance measures of non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public 
during 2002–2007 (for which we need 3 years of accounting data prior to the IPO and 3 years of 
accounting data after the IPO). The market-based performance measures are the buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted returns (BHRs) and the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) 
accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 months starting from one month after the IPO month. We calculate 
the CARs measure based on monthly market-adjust stock returns, and compute the market returns 
as the weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges. 
The accounting return measures are the change in return on sales (ROS), sales growth, and earnings 
growth. The change in ROS is measured as the difference between the average annual ROS for the 
three years after the IPO and that for the three years before the IPO year, adjusted by the specific 
industry median. The sales (earnings) growth variables are the growth rates of sales (earnings) from 
the average annual sales (earnings) in the three years before the IPO year to that in the three years 
after the IPO year, adjusted by the specific industry median. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of firms by IPO year and industry 
 




Total Percentage of 
IPOs with excess 
control 
2002 6 6 12 50.00 
2003 9 13 22 40.91 
2004 31 18 49 63.27 
2005 8 0 8 100.00 
2006 20 14 34 58.82 
2007 39 36 75 52.00 
2008 25 33 58 43.10 
      
Public utilities 12 12 24 50.00 
Real estate 5 3 8 62.50 
Conglomerate 5 5 10 55.00  
Industrial 110 99 209 52.63  
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Commercial 6 1 7 58.71  
      
Total 138 120 258 53.49 
 
Panel B: Characteristics of IPO firms 
      
 Mean Median Min Max Std. dev. 
Initial return (%) 126.20  92.50  -9.00  538.12  101.71  
Market-adjusted initial 
return (%) 
125.72  90.70  -5.72  525.75  100.49  
Firm age (Years) 5.86  5.00  2.00  21.00  3.01  
Issue size (in millions)  34.08  28.00  12.50  210.00  21.03  
Days elapsed between 
offering and listing  
15.38  15.50  9.00  25.00  3.44  
Offer price  10.83  10.04  2.60  36.00  5.01  
Cash flow rights (%) 32.15  30.16  0.00  78.18  15.94  
Excess control rights 
(%)  
7.48  1.82  0.00  34.66  9.28  
 
Panel C: Market-based performance and accounting-based performance 
 
 Mean Median Min. Max. Std. dev. Obs. 
Market-adj. BHR 12 
months after IPO (%) 
-18.64 -8.19 -272.39 284.59 71.26 258 
Market-adj. BHR 24 
months after IPO (%) 
0.82 -6.49 -372.65 462.05 89.29 258 
Market-adj. BHR 36 
months after IPO (%) 
8.26 -5.24 -388.87 2186.91 209.65 244 
 
CAR 12 months after 
IPO (%) 
-6.45 -7.25 -130.61 130.58 46.19 258 
CAR 24 months after 
IPO (%) 
6.32 5.80 -116.44 166.46 56.30 
258 
CAR 36 months after 
IPO (%) 
13.88 13.18 -133.60 208.30 67.52 244 
 
Change in ROS (%) -11.94 -8.39 -811.43 55.71 68.75 200 
Growth in sales (%) 124.37 82.87 -152.23 1693.90 196.61 200 
Growth in earnings 
(%) 




Table 2: Mean and median statistics of post-IPO performance measures 
 
This table presents the mean and median values for market-based performance measures of 
non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public during 2002–2008 and for the accounting-based 
performance measures of non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public during 2002–2007. 
The firms are sorted by whether or not the ultimately controlling shareholders have cash flow rights 
in excess of their control rights. The market-based performance measures are the buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted returns (BHRs) and the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) 
accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 months starting from one month after the IPO month. We calculate 
the CARs measure based on monthly market-adjusted stock returns and compute market returns as 
the weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. 
We use 258 firms to compute the BHRs and CARs for 12 and 24 months and 244 firms to compute 
the BHRs and CARs for 36 months. The accounting return measures are the change in return on 
sales (ROS), sales growth, and earnings growth. The change in ROS is measured as the difference 
between the average annual ROS for the three years after the IPO and that for the three years before 
the IPO year, adjusted by the specific-industry median. The sales (earnings) growth variables are 
the growth rates of sales (earnings) from the average annual sales (earnings) in the three years 
before the IPO year to that in the three years after the IPO year, adjusted by the specific industry 
median. We use a total of 200 firms to compute the change in ROS, sales growth, and earnings 




 With excess 
control 
Without excess  
control 
Difference p-value of mean 
(median)  
difference 
Market-adj. BHR over 
the market 12 months 
after IPO (%) 
258 
Mean -24.08 -12.39 -11.69* 0.0947 
0.0045 Median -12.92 -0.38 -12.54*** 
Market-adj. BHR 24 
months after IPO (%) 
258 
Mean -12.87 16.57 -29.44*** 0.004 
0.002 Median -17.04 9.43 -26.47*** 
Market-adj. BHR 36 
month after IPO (%) 
244 
Mean -6.52 25.70 -32.22 0.116 
0.009 Median -17.62 8.49 -26.11*** 
CAR 12 months after IPO 
(%) 
258 
Mean -13.44 1.59 -15.03*** 0.004 
0.002 Median -20.17 6.08 -26.24*** 
CAR 24 months after IPO 
(%) 
258 
Mean -4.49 18.76 -23.25*** 0.000 
0.000 Median -9.29 22.98 -32.27*** 
CAR 36 months after IPO 
(%) 
244 
Mean 1.92 27.99 -26.08*** 0.001 
0.003 Median 2.08 24.03 -21.95*** 
Change in  200 Mean -15.37 -7.48 -7.88 0.211 
37 
 
ROS (%) Median -5.87 -8.43 2.57 0.808 
Growth in  
sales (%) 
200 
Mean 119.64 130.53 -10.89 0.350 
0.233 Median 69.29 98.06 -28.77 
Growth in earnings (%) 200 
Mean 16.51 53.85 -37.33* 0.089 




Table 3: GLS regression results for the effects of disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO stock performance (BHRs)  
 
In this table, the dependent variable is market-based performance, measured as the accumulated 
BHRs for 12, 24, and 36 months, starting from one month after the IPO month. The BHR measures 
are calculated based on monthly market-adjusted stock returns; market returns are computed as the 
value weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock 
exchanges. The independent variables, measured at IPO year, include the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge), and a 
dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ 
cash flow rights and control rights is larger than zero. Also included are the debt-to-sales ratio 
(Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies. p-values are in parentheses; 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Market-adj. BHR 12  
months after IPO 
Market-adj. BHR 24 
months after IPO 
Market-adj. BHR 36 
months after IPO 
Const -99.663 -104.640 38.142 80.852 391.199** 450.645** 
 (0.247) (0.201) (0.720) (0.454) (0.039) (0.015) 
Cash 0.125 0.254* 0.249 0.352 0.055 0.137 
 (0.453) (0.089) (0.249) (0.101) (0.892) (0.710) 
Ex_wedge -0.548*  -0.680**  -0.773  
 (0.058)  (0.029)  (0.194)  
Ex_dummy  -9.018**  -8.271  -4.931 
  (0.046)  (0.161)  (0.657) 
LnAsset 4.960 5.087 -2.744 -5.097 -19.934** -23.361** 
 (0.255) (0.216) (0.621) (0.363) (0.040) (0.013) 
Leverage -0.004 -0.054 -0.007 0.008 -0.011 0.021 
 (0.939) (0.275) (0.920) (0.917) (0.930) (0.860) 
Exchange 25.805*** 29.161*** 3.339 1.731 -9.132 -20.905 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.856) (0.928) (0.875) (0.703) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 258 258 258 258 244 244 
Adj. R
2






Table 4: GLS regression results of the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO stock performance (CARs)   
 
In this table, the dependent variable is market-based performance, measured as the market-adjusted 
stock returns (CARs) accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 months, starting from one month after the IPO 
month. The CAR measures are calculated based on monthly market-adjusted stock returns; market 
returns are computed as the value weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen 
and Shanghai stock exchanges. The independent variables, measured at the year of the IPO, include 
the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of excess control rights 
(Ex_wedge), and a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately 
controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights are larger than zero. Also included are 
the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to 
one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies. 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR 12 months after IPO CAR 24 months after IPO CAR 36 months after IPO 
Const -45.113 -46.644 -90.984 -2.312 238.746* 281.776** 
 (0.583) (0.577) (0.400) (0.983) (0.062) (0.029) 
Cash 0.139 0.203 0.176 0.330 -0.207 -0.116 
 (0.405) (0.200) (0.406) (0.101) (0.402) (0.627) 
Ex_wedge -0.620**  -1.037***  -1.162***  
 (0.026)  (0.003)  (0.007)  
Ex_dummy  -8.734*  -15.437***  -13.627* 
  (0.070)  (0.009)  (0.078) 
LnAsset 2.486 2.168 3.830 -0.979 -12.559* -15.083** 
 (0.551) (0.607) (0.484) (0.856) (0.051) (0.020) 
Leverage -0.059 -0.080 -0.192*** -0.107 -0.008 0.025 
 (0.278) (0.160) (0.007) (0.143) (0.910) (0.736) 
Exchange 29.187*** 28.945*** 3.942 1.751 -15.111 -17.457 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.731) (0.880) (0.410) (0.364) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 258 258 258 258 244 244 
Adj. R
2




Table 5: GLS regression results for the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO accounting-based performance  
 
In this table, the dependent variable is, alternately, change in ROS, sales growth, and earnings 
growth. The change in ROS variable is measured as the difference between the average annual 
ROS three years post IPO year and that of the three years before the IPO year, adjusted by the 
specific industry median. The sales (earnings) growth variables are the growth rates of sales 
(earnings) from the average annual sales (earnings) in the three years before the IPO year to 
that in the three years after the IPO year, adjusted by the specific industry median. The 
independent variables, measured at the year of the IPO, include the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge), a 
dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights are larger than zero, the debt-to-sales ratio 
(Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new 
issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies. p-values are 
in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
       
    
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Change in ROS Growth in sales Growth in earnings 
Const -0.784 -0.268 -9.756*** -8.958** -12.455*** -12.663*** 
 (0.982) (0.994) (0.004) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash -0.023 -0.047 -0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.734) (0.461) (0.412) (0.451) (0.941) (0.644) 
Ex_wedge -0.216*  -0.037***  -0.033***  
 (0.068)  (0.000)  (0.005)  
Ex_dummy  -3.863**  -0.271  -0.501** 
  (0.037)  (0.129)  (0.017) 
LnAsset 2.004 2.142 0.561*** 0.477*** 0.698*** 0.701*** 
 (0.251) (0.217) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.059 -0.081** -0.003 -0.002 -0.010*** -0.012*** 
 (0.116) (0.032) (0.393) (0.560) (0.002) (0.000) 
Exchange 13.753 19.040 0.570 0.552 1.441*** 1.284*** 
 (0.260) (0.186) (0.150) (0.156) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Adj. R
2
 0.841 0.844 0.094 0.028 0.134 0.141 
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Table 6: GLS regression results for the effects of disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO accounting-based performance   
 
In this table, the dependent variable is, alternately, the change in operating earnings/assets 
(OE/A), the operating earnings growth, and the net income growth. The change in the OE/A 
variable is measured as the difference between the average annual OE/A of the three years post 
IPO and that of the three years pre IPO, adjusted by the specific industry median. The 
operating earnings (net income) growth variables are the growth rates of the operating earnings 
(net income) from the average annual operating earnings (net income) of the three years before 
the IPO year to that of the three years after the IPO year, adjusted by the specific industry 
median. The independent variables, measured at the year of the IPO, include the ultimately 
controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of excess control rights 
(Ex_wedge), a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately 
controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights is larger than zero, the 
debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), a dummy (Exchange) equal to 
one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and year and industry dummies. 
p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Change in OE/A Growth in operating earnings Growth in net income 
Const 8.433 15.849 -12.074*** -10.890** -13.698*** -12.369*** 
 (0.632) (0.380) (0.006) (0.012) (0.002) (0.007) 
Cash -0.064** -0.063** 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.868) (0.640) (0.866) (0.871) 
Ex_wedge -0.084**  -0.031**  -0.037***  
 (0.043)  (0.018)  (0.004)  
Ex_dummy  -0.631  -0.486**  -0.575** 
  (0.474)  (0.035)  (0.011) 
LnAsset 0.655 0.335 0.656*** 0.586*** 0.769*** 0.695*** 
 (0.367) (0.635) (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.025** -0.026** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.041) (0.029) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exchange 0.797 1.667 1.220*** 1.041** 1.533*** 1.380*** 
 (0.686) (0.408) (0.006) (0.022) (0.001) (0.002) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Obs. 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Adj. R
2




Table 7: Calendar-time market-adjusted performance 
 
The sample, which covers January 2002 to December 2008, comprises 138 non-state controlled 
IPOs whose largest shareholders have excess control rights and 120 non-state controlled IPOs 
whose largest shareholders have no excess control rights. We compile the monthly portfolios of 
IPO groups by including all issues undertaken in the three years previous to the month of 
observation. We then calculate average monthly excess returns for each calendar year, adjusting 
all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges (A shares and 
Growth Enterprise Market) by both equal and value weighting. Both the equally weighted and 
value weighted calendar-time portfolios are based on initial trading day market capitalization. 




IPOs with excess control rights IPOs without excess control rights 
Relative to EW  
market (percent) 
Relative to VW  
market (percent) 
Relative to EW  
market (percent) 
Relative to VW 
market (percent) 
Panel A: Equally weighted calendar-time portfolio 
2002 -0.28 -0.61 -0.97 -1.30 
2003 0.51 -1.03 -0.86 -2.40*** 
2004 0.01 0.03 0.84 0.86 
2005 1.04 0.65 1.94* 1.55 
2006 -1.37** -3.12* -0.96 -2.71 
2007 -4.42** -0.17 -3.81** 0.43 
2008 0.70 2.58 0.93 2.81 
Mean -0.56 -0.21 -0.37 -0.01 
Panel B: Value weighted calendar-time portfolio 
2002 -0.11 -0.44 -1.31 -1.64 
2003 0.40 -1.13* -0.81 -2.35** 
2004 -0.09 -0.07 1.14 1.16 
2005 1.22 0.83 1.90** 1.52 
2006 -0.83 -2.58 -0.88 -2.63 
2007 -5.21*** -0.96 -4.63** -0.38 
2008 0.07 1.95 0.75 2.64 






Table 8: CAPM and Fama and French (1992) three-factor regressions on 
calendar-time portfolio returns  
 
The sample, which covers January 2002 to December 2008, comprises 138 non-state controlled 
IPOs whose largest shareholders have excess control rights and 120 non-state controlled IPOs 
whose largest shareholders have no excess control rights. We compile the monthly portfolios of 
the IPO groups by including all issues undertaken in the three years previous to the month of 
the observation. Here, 
 
where  is the equally or value weighted return of these portfolios less the risk-free 
rate (monthly rate of one-year fixed term deposit rate from CSMAR ) and  is the 
value weighted market return on all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Stock Exchanges (A shares and Growth Enterprise Market) minus the risk-free rate. SMB 
(small minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small and large 
capitalization firms; HML (high minus low) is the difference each month between the return of 
a portfolio containing high book-to-markets stocks and the return of a portfolio containing low 
book-to-market stocks. Both equally weighted and value weighted calendar-time portfolios are 
based on initial trading day market capitalization. p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively  
 
 IPOs with excess control IPOs without excess control 

















Alpha -0.162 -0.281 -0.274 -0.301 0.017 -0.097 0.032 -0.155 
 (0.824) (0.684) (0.738) (0.710) (0.983) (0.900) (0.971) (0.864) 
RMRF 0.892*** 0.876*** 0.886*** 0.872*** 0.927*** 0.916*** 0.922*** 0.912*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SMB   0.472*** 0.303**   0.451*** 0.353** 
   (0.001) (0.029)   (0.004) (0.024) 
HML   0.084 0.066   0.109 0.069 
   (0.420) (0.520)   (0.338) (0.551) 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
adj. R
2





Table 9: Logistical regressions on the likelihood of undertaking value-destroying 
related party transactions 
 
In this table, the dependent variable is a value-destroying connected transactions dummy that 
equals one if the firm has undertaken a connected transaction associated with negative 
cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) over trading day window [0,+1], 
[-1,+1], [-2,+2], [-2,+5] relative to the announcement day (day 0). The sample includes a total 
of 4,106 related party transactions over 36 months for 244 IPO firms, starting from one month 
after the IPO month. We calculate the CARs based on daily market-adjusted stock returns and 
compute the market returns as the value weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the 
Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges. The independent variables, measured at the year of the 
IPO, include the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash), the degree of 
excess control rights (Ex_wedge), and a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge 
between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights are larger 
than zero. Also included are the debt-to-sales ratio (Leverage), the log of total assets (LnAsset), 
a dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
and year and industry dummies. p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable  
=1 if CAR[0,+1] <0 =1 if CAR[-1,+1] <0 =1 if CAR[-2,+2] <0 =1 if CAR[-2,+5] <0 
Const 9.051*** 6.284*** 8.816*** 7.382*** 21.233*** 19.965*** 18.787*** 16.943*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ex_wedge 0.037***  0.020***  0.018***  0.027***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Ex_dummy  1.022***  0.842***  0.551***  0.748*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LnAsset -0.470*** -0.328*** -0.297*** -0.227*** -0.944*** -0.880*** -0.838*** -0.740*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.001* -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.150) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.235) (0.395) 
Exchange 0.414*** 0.517*** 0.766*** 0.737*** 1.212*** 1.241*** 0.965*** 1.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 4106 
pseudo R
2




Table 10: Mean and median statistics of initial returns 
 
This table reports mean and median statistics of the initial (first day) stock returns of non-state 
controlled IPOs grouped by whether or not the Chinese IPO firm is subject to excess 
shareholder control during 2002–2008.The initial return of an IPO is measured as the 
difference between the closing stock price on the first trading day and the offering price, and 
then divided by the offering price adjusted by market return.*, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
   Market-adjusted initial returns (%) 
 Obs.  
Excess  
control > 0 
Excess  







2002 12 Mean 113.85  139.28  -25.44  0.318 1.000 
Median 98.69  89.90  8.79  
2003 22 Mean 65.60  54.92  10.68  0.215 0.333 
Median 54.45  45.96  8.49  
2004 49 Mean 70.00  75.34  -5.34  0.392 0.836 
Median 60.24  52.00  8.24  
2005 8 Mean 30.49       
Median 27.35     
2006 34 Mean 91.88  97.06  -5.18  0.400 0.327 
Median 82.97  87.14  -4.17  
2007 75 Mean 178.07  235.59  -57.52*** 0.010 0.061 
Median 166.70  198.88  -32.19* 
2008 58 Mean 122.39  126.08  -3.69  0.441 0.931 
Median 28.38  33.43  -5.05  
Total  258 Mean 112.53  140.89  -28.35** 0.011 0.0867 
  Median 88.24  101.70  -13.46* 
46 
 
Table 11: GLS Regression results for the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the underpricing  
 
In this regression model, the dependent variables are the unadjusted initial return 
(FirstDayReturn) and the market-adjusted return (AdjustedFirstDayReturn). The independent 
variables are the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (Cash); the degree of 
excess control rights (Ex_wedge); a dummy (Ex_dummy) equal to one if the wedge between 
the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights is larger than zero.; 
and firm age (LnAge), represented by the natural logarithm of one plus the age in years of the 
company from the date on which it was first listed (with any part of a year treated as a whole 
year). Also included are the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and 
listing dates (LnDays); issue size, (LnIssueSize) represented by the natural logarithm of the 
number of shares issued; a dummy (Exchange) equal to one if the new issue is listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and industry and year dummies. p-values are in parentheses; *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 First day return Adjusted first day return 
Constant 171.18*** 157.26*** 603.25*** 590.93*** 166.33*** 167.96*** 677.46*** 648.65*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cash   0.123 0.165   0.042 -0.072 
   (0.610) (0.451)   (0.874) (0.734) 
Ex_wedge -1.118***  -0.556  -1.265***  -0.482  
 (0.000)  (0.119)  (0.000)  (0.193)  
Ex_dumm
y 
 -15.089*  -15.673*  -16.222*  -19.344** 
  (0.054)  (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.016) 
LnAge   -0.217 6.534   -0.284 12.198* 
   (0.978) (0.394)   (0.971) (0.096) 
LnDays   3.739 7.044   -1.398 -12.564 
   (0.852) (0.712)   (0.948) (0.552) 
LnIssueSi
ze 
  -25.75*** -27.13***   -28.52*** -27.26*** 
   (0.003) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Exchange   -23.232 -20.152   -24.754 -16.033 
   (0.185) (0.212)   (0.134) (0.303) 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 258 
adj. R
2





Figure 1: Mean post-IPO buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (BHRs) 
from one to 36 months after the initial trading month  
 













Panel B: Cumulative Return over the market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
